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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
he may iely on it." The general rule is: that one cannot rely on an
agent's assumption, of authority, but one must investigate and ascertain
the nature and extent of the agent's powers.12 Such an agent as
defendant's is by no means a universal agent; but is restricted "to
those acts and contracts usually exercised by other-agents in the same
line of business under similar circumstances, and must conduct the
particular business of the principal in-the manner usually employed by
other agents of the same kind." 13 One dealing with'an agent with
knowledge of limitations on the agent's authority cannot hold the
principal for acts of the agergt outside those limitations.14 A third
person dealing with one known to be an agent is not relieved of all
.obligation in the matter, but is held to the exercise of reasonable pru-
dence, and, if an agent, though a general one, departing fronf'legiti-
mate effort in his employer's interests, tenders a contract so unusual
and remarkable as to arouse the inquiry of a man of average business
prudence, the third party is not allowed to act upon assumptions which
ordinarily obtain; he is put upon notice and must ascertain if actual
authority has been conferred. Any substantial departure by an agent
from the usual methods of -conducting business is ordinarily a suffi-
cient warning of lack of authorization.15 The person dealing with the
agent should ascertain the extent of his authority from the principal or
from some other person who will have a motive to tell the truth in the
interests of the principal, and he cannot rely upon the agent's state-
ment or assumption of authority or upon the mere presumption of
authority.1
R. E..B..
SCHOOL BOARDs-DIsciToNARY POWER-APPOINTMENT OF
PROFESSORS-JUDICIAL REviEw.-The petitioner, a citizen and tax-
payer of the City of New York, seeks an order under Article 78 of
the New York Civil Practice Act 1 revoking the appointment of Dr.
Bertrand Russell by the Board of Higher Education of the City of
New York to the Chair of Philosophy in the College of the City of
New York and discharging the appointee from said position. The
21 Hill v. James, 148 Minn. 261, 181 N. W. 577 (1921).
12 W. W. Marshall & Co. v. Kirschbraun & Sons, 100 Neb. 876, 161 N. W.
577 (1917).
"3 A. H. Stephens v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 107, 109, 75
S. E. 933, 939 (1912).
14 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Coughlin, 40 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930).
15 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1932) § 166a.
'
6 Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Potomac Builder's Supply 'Co., 61 F.
(2d) 407 (App. D. C. 1932).
'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac-r § 1283.
[ VO.L. 15
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appointment is alleged to be illegal for three reasons: viz., the ap-
pointee is not a citizen and has not applied to become a citizen as re-
quired by Education Law Section 550; 2 the appointment violates
Article V, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of New York,8
as it was not based upon a competitive examination although it did
not appear that such an examination was impracticable; and, lastly,
the appointment was against public policy, because of Dr. Russell's
teachings and immoral character. The Corporation Counsel moved
to dismiss solely on the ground that the Board of Higher Education
is not required to employ citizens. The other issues were not con-
tested. Held, order granted revoking the appointment of Bertrand
Russell, discharging him from his said position, and denying to him
the rights and privileges and powers appertaining to his appointment.
The decision of the court rests upon all three of the grounds alleged.
Kay v. Board of Higher Education, 193 Misc. 943, 18 N. Y. S. (2d)
821 (1940).
The Board of Higher Education 4 was created to control and
administer generally all public education in the City of New York
beyond high school level.? Its powers, within its sphere, are com-
parable to those generally conferred upon school boards.6 Thus, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory restrictions the Board has
the broad discretionary power which has long been recognized as an
essential attribute of school boards, and with which the courts will
not interfere in the absence of abuse of authority, arbitrary action,
or a violation of law.7  Where a particular matter is delimited by
2 N. Y. ED. LAw § 550 ("No person shall be employed or authorized to
teach in the public schools of the state who is: * * * (3) Not a citizen. The
provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now
or hereafter employed provided such teacher shall make due application to
become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become
a citizen"). -
3 N. Y. CONST. art. V, § 6 ("Appointments and promotions in the civil
service of the state, and of all the civil divisions thereof including cities and
villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained so far as
practicable, by examinations, which -so far as practical, shall be competitive;
• * * L §14 Nh. Y. ED. LAW § 1142.
G N. Y. ED. LAW § 1143.
6 Ibid.
7 People v. Regents of University, 18 Mich. 469 (1869) (mandamus to
compel appointment of professor denied) ; Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245,
197 N. W. 510 (1924) ("The courts will not interfere with the exercise of dis-
cretion by school directors in matters confided by law to'their judgment, unless
there is a clear abuse of the discretion, or a violation of law * * * [but] * * *
The reasonableness of regulations is a question of law for the courts");
Gleason v. University of Minnesota, 104 Minn. 359, 116 N. W. 650 (1908)
(where regents of university refuse to perform their duty mandamus will lie
although they are vested by law with exclusive management of educational
affairs); Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222, 236 N. W. 217(1931) (regents of state university held not subject to legislative, executive, or
judicial control within their granted power); State ex rel. Keetiey v. Ayers,
108 Mont. 547, 92 P. (2d) 306 (1939); Carnes v. Finley, 98 Misc. 390, 164
1940 ]
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statute or constitutional provision the Board's discretion must give
way to the law, s and even acts of the Board which have received the
express sanction of the legislature are void if contrary to a constitu-
tional r~quirement.9 Whenever a school board does an act in viola-
tion of a statutory requirement that it appoint only citizens, or aliens
who have evidenced an intention to become citizens, or in violation
of an express constitutional provision that teachers be appointed on
the basis of competitive examinations, the courts may intervene upon
proper application to restrain a violation of the law; 10 hence, there
is no doubt as to the soundness of the first two points on which the
court has rested its decision in the instant case. The third point upon
-which the court relied in its decision, i.e., the failure of the Board of
Higher Education to dispute the question of the immoral character
and teachings of the appointee, is in the realm of controversy because
frequent intervention by the courts upon slight pretext would result
in substituting the judgment of the court for that of the body entrust-
ed with educational affairs.' The case of Epstein v. Board of Edu-
cation,12 which was largely relied on by the court, did not involve the
morals of a teacher, but it contained a strong dictum that courts may
interfere to protect the community's safety and welfare when a school
board's acts are inimical to it.'3 Although courts of equity usually
are concerned with property rights, they may exercise their injunctive
N. Y. Supp. 305 (1917) (courts will not interfere with constitutional exercise
of discretion); Hysong v. Gallitzian School District, 164 Pa. 629, 30 At. 482(1894); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S. W. (2d) 805 (1932) (courts
will not interfere with rules of board of regents of university in absence of
showing of abuse of authority or arbitrary action).
8 Matter of Sloat v. Board of Examiners, 274 N. Y. 367, 9 N. E. (2d) 12
(1937) ("Disobedience or evasion of a constitutional mandate may not be tol-
erated even though such disobedience might, perhaps, promote in some respects
the best interests of the public. Arbitrary decision that in a given case it is not
practicable to ascertain merit and fitness by competitive examinations may be
challenged and is subject to review by the courts").
9 Matter of Keymer, 148 N. Y. 341, 42 N. E. 667 (1896) (a mere arbitrary
declaration by the legislature that competitive examinations of veterans are
impracticable plainly violates N. Y. CoNsT. art. V, § 6) ; Matter of Barthelmess
v. Cukor, 231 N. Y. 435, 132 N. E. 140 (1921) ; Matter of Carow v. Board of
Education, 272 N. Y. 341, 6 N. E. (2d) 47 (1936).
10 N. Y. CoNs'r. art. V, § 6 (see note 3, supra) , Matter of Becker v.
Eisner, 277 N. Y. 143, 13 N. E. (2d) 747 (1938) (unless the legislature or
some other body finds it impracticable to give teachers competitive examinations
N. Y. CoNsT. art. V, § 6 must apply to the Board of Higher Education).
11 See note 7, supra.
12 162 Misc. 718, 295 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1936).
:1 Matter of Epstein v. Board of Education, 162 Misc. 718, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 796 (1936) ("A person is not to be denied a license to teach in the public
schools solely because of his economic or political views, nor because he has
theretofore given lawful expression to those views. A different situation would
be presented if one advocated the overthrow of the government by force, or
when such utterances were such as tended to bring such person into conflict with
the Penal Law of the State, or were beyond that limit of freedom of speech
guaranteed by our fundamental law").
[ VOL. 15
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power to secure the public health, morals, safety and welfare. 14  To
appoint one whose teachings and whose example tend to destroy the
very institutions which form the basis of a well ordered society is
clearly not within the limits of a school board's discretionary power.15
In the instant case, as has been stated, no defense was offered by the
Corporation Counsel of the appointee's character, nor did he make
any attempt to justify or explain passages which the court has quoted
from writings of Russell. These passages standing alone and un-
explained clearly establish that the appointee has subscribed to
theories, which if implemented, would result in a lowering of the com-
munity's morality and in violations of the Penal Law. The appoint-
ment of a person with such views to instruct the young in a public
university would certainly constitute an abuse of discretion which,
consistent with the principles of law applicable, would warrant an ex-
ercise of the court's injunctive power.
A. J. G.
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT---"RESTRAINTS oF TRADE"-AP-
PLICATXON TO LABOR UNIONS.-Petitioner, a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion, is engaged in the manufacture of hosiery, a substantial part of
which is shipped in interstate commerce. In April, 1937 it was oper-
ating a non-union shop. A demand of the respondent Federation at
that time for a closed shop was refused. Upon continued refusal of
the petitioner to sign a contract for a closed shop respondent Leader
ordered a sit-down strike. Immediately acts of violence against the
plant were commenced. The strikers were, however, forcibly ejected
pursuant to an injunction.1 Shipments were prevented by the occu-
pation of the factory by the strikers. This action is brought to re-
cover treble the amount of damage inflicted in the conducting of the
strike alleged to be a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.2 A judgment for petitioner was reversed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals.3 Upon certiorari4 to the Supreme Court of the
24 Matter of Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936 (1920); People ex rel.
Bennett v. Laman, 277 N. Y. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 439 (1938).
'5 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571 (1925)
*** that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition,
that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare") ; Matter
of Epstein v. Board of Education, 162 Misc. 718, 295 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1936).
1Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 90 F. (2d) 155, 159 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937),
rev'd and dismissal ordered sub non., Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 302 U. S.
656, 58 Sup. Ct. 362 (1937).226 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1927).
3 108 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) (reversal on ground that interstate
commerce restrained was unsubstantial for it was less than three per cent of
total output of industry in. country).
4 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 589 (1940).
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